Funded by the NASA New Millennium Program (NMP) Space Technology 8 (ST8) project since 2004, the Dependable Multiprocessor (DM) project is a major step toward NASA's long-held desire to take advantage of high-performance, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology in onboard processing solutions for space applications. A DM system is a cluster of high-performance COTS processors connected with a high speed interconnect and operating under the control of a radiation-hardened system controller executing platform and technology-independent fault tolerant middleware. This platform and technologyindependent middleware is DM technology and its development represents a significant paradigm shift. For applications that only need to be radiation tolerant, DM technology allows the user to employ ten to one hundred times the processing capability of current radiation-hardened, software-based processing systems. DM technology is softwareimplemented and platform and technology independent, thus enabling space missions to employ current COTS devices as opposed to radiation-hardened technologies that are Nomenclature Availability = the probability that the DM system is available to perform data computations over a specified period of time
Nomenclature

Availability
= the probability that the DM system is available to perform data computations over a specified period of time
Computational consistency = the number of failures expected, with 95% confidence, after five years of continuous operation
Computational success = the probability that a job generates output data without error and delivered in a timely manner Coverage = the percentage of all possible faults that are correctly detected and handled by the system Error syndrome = the resulting symptom within the DM system that occurs due to an error Relevant environment = worst case synthesis of GEO heavy ion environment and LEO proton environment, exclusive of solar flare or coronal mass ejection events Throughput = number of arithmetic operations divided by execution time Throughput density = throughput divided by the power
II. DM Technology Overview
DM is a software-implemented, platform-independent technology. DM uses software techniques to enhance the fault tolerance of an innovative system (hardware and software) architecture. DM technology provides an underlying infrastructure that supports transparent management of jobs and resources. It also presents a set of APIs such that the user can easily access DM resources and use DM mechanisms to enhance the fault tolerance of the user's applications. The seven TRL6 criteria listed in Table 1 provide a good overview of the functional and performance objectives of DM technology. Demonstrate the ability to provide predicted Computational Consistency and Availability > 0.995 while providing a performance of 300 MOPS/Watt (as defined above) with confidence level of 0.95 in the relevant environment, while executing realistic benchmark parallel codes.
3
Demonstrate the ability to provide predicted coverage ≥ 0.9999 while providing a performance of 300 MOPS/Watt with a confidence level of 0.95 in the relevant environment, while executing realistic benchmark parallel codes.
4
Using the DM models, predict the computational consistency, availability, throughput and throughput density, of the DM in a 450 × 950 km sun synchronous orbit. Demonstrate that the models can be used to predict the probabilistic time varying fault rates, error rates and performance metrics encountered in this orbit, including solar events, and that, under these conditions, excluding solar events, the DM provides 0.995 computational consistency and availability.
5
Demonstrate that the system can be scaled to 20 nodes while meeting 0.995 computational consistency and availability, and 300 MOPS/Watt in the relevant environment, while executing realistic benchmark parallel codes.
S
Criteria No. Criteria
6
Demonstrate that a competent programmer knowledgeable in high-level parallel programming but with no knowledge of fault tolerance can convert a program (see below) to a fully functional, debugged, fault-tolerant program (or a program running on the DM fault-tolerant computer) in no longer than one hour per ten lines of executable code (non-comment, non-punctuation) source code.
The program must run parallel computations with check pointing and recovery, and execute within 150% of the time required to execute a non-fault tolerant version of the same code on the same number of processors. The program converted must be one not already used or investigated by the ST 8 DM program before being selected for conversion.
7
Demonstrate that the output of the system error model correlates to the results of the system level radiation testing to within 20%. Correlation shall include error syndromes, error rates, recovery actions, and recovery times.
The following subsections present details on the key components within the hardware and software architectures that provide DM-enabled systems with the capabilities and features necessary to address the criteria in Table 1 . Figure 1 illustrates the basic DM hardware architecture. The architecture consists of a cluster of highperformance COTS data processors (DPs) connected through a high-speed network interconnect and operating under the control of a radiation-hardened system controller. The system controller provides a highly reliable and SEEimmune host to support recovery from radiation-induced events in the COTS hardware. Redundancy in the network interconnect and system controller are supported. Additionally, the system can be augmented with mission-specific elements, including mass storage, custom I/O, and custom sensors as required. For more details on the DM Hardware Architecture, refer to Ref. 1 .
A. DM Hardware Architecture
B. DM Software Architecture
A top-level overview of DM software architecture is depicted in Figure 2 . The DM software architecture includes middleware layers that provide fault tolerance for the cluster and an isolation layer that makes porting between platforms a simple and straightforward process. The DM Middleware (DMM) includes Application Services, a COTS High Availability Middleware (HAM), and System Services. The Application Services provide user-level APIs that allow applications to reap the benefits of the fault tolerance provided by the DM Middleware without requiring application developers to a detailed understanding of the DM software architecture. These APIs include the Mass Data Storage (MDS) interface, the Algorithmic-Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) interface, and the Fault-tolerant Embedded Message Passing Interface (FEMPI). The MDS interface allows applications to access a mass storage device in order to retrieve input data and save output data as well as checkpoint intermediate results. The ABFT interface supports a number of common linear algebra and other operations that provide data redundancy to detect and possibly recover data errors. Finally, FEMPI enables users to parallelize application across the full set of DM hardware resources using a fault-tolerant subset of the familiar and widely used Message Passing Interface (MPI) parallel processing software.
The HAM is transparent to application software and is responsible for monitoring the state changes in system resources, services, and applications. The HAM provides a reliable messaging infrastructure (including network failover) that is a key resource for the higher-level APIs. It also provides automatic heartbeat mechanisms to detect the liveliness of monitored components.
The System Services include the Fault Tolerance Manager (FTM), Job Manager (JM), Job Manager Agent (JMA), and Mission Manager (MM). These services are used by payload control software to manage the DM cluster. The FTM maintains the status of system components and agents, provides status and synchronization information to the JM, and detects faulty objects (applications, agents and nodes). The JM schedules, recovers and deploys jobs as well as cleans check-point data and tasks after failures. The JMA executes tasks and relays application status such as hangs and crashes to the FTM and JM. The JMA also receives fault detection indications from user-defined detection techniques, e.g., ABFT, replication comparison and voting results, and captures OS exceptions caused by application exceptions. Finally, the MM manages mission-level policies such as replication (e.g. spatial or temporal, self-checking pair or triple modular redundancy), periodicity, job scheduling, time outs, and the cleanup of replica data.
For more details on the DM Software Architecture, refer to Ref. 2. Figure 3 illustrates the DM TRL6 testbed. The testbed is composed of a single system controller and four COTS DP boards interconnected with an Ethernet network for data traffic and a CompactPCI backplane for control signals (e.g. discrete). The COTS DP boards were the Expedite 6031 boards with a PPC 7447a processor with an integrated AltiVec processing engine. These boards were selected for use in the TRL6 testbed because, at the time (i.e. 2006 timeframe), the 7447a was the highest throughput density (MOPS/watt) general purpose processor available in a ruggedized and conductively-cooled package. Analysis presented at the DM CDR showed that the Expedite 6031 boards could meet actual launch and thermal environment requirements such as those of the ST8 flight experiment. The testbed was configured with one of the four DPs emulating a mass data storage unit. This testbed setup was used for performance, fault injection, and radiation testing in order to collect data necessary to validate the DM technology.
C. TRL6 Testbed
III. DM Technology Validation Approach
The approach used to validate the DM Technology is summarized in the below list. A graphical representation of the validation process is provided in Figure 4 .
1. Select a realistic science application, run it on the TRL6 testbed, measure/estimate the operation count, execution time, and average power, and calculate the throughput density. 2. Perform heavy ion and proton component-level radiation testing to characterize the performance of the testbed COTS components in a radiation environment. 3. Profile TRL6 testbed system executing the selected application to gather baseline statistics on the resources used by the system. 4. Perform controlled Software Implemented Fault Injection (SWIFI) testing to characterize DM system response to injected faults including the collection of detection and recovery statistics. 5. Predict the performance, availability * , and computational consistency of the TRL6 testbed in a given radiation environment using the results from component-level radiation and SWIFI tests as inputs to predictive models (i.e. SpaceRad, CREME96, and custom models). 6. Perform system-level radiation testing to verify that the DM system operates as designed in a radiation environment and to validate the system-level error statistics predicted by models. 7. Select third party member to evaluate programmability and ease of use of DM technology.
The following subsections provide details on each step of the validation approach outlined above.
A. Realistic Science Application
For this project, the realistic science application had to exhibit the following characteristics according to the directions of the DM Technical Review Board (TRB):
1. Written using MPI 2. Code segments protected by ABFT 3. Code segments protected by replication 4. Tasks (a scheduled code entity) contains both ABFT and replication-protected code 5. Complex data flow and communication patterns 6. State data preserved over multiple computing cycles A Hyperspectral Imaging (HSI) application was selected since it showed the first five characteristics above. The implementation could be modified to preserve state after one of the computation stages; however, the modification was not conducted in order to avoid costly verification of application changes. The HSI application was optimized using the ATLAS tool. ATLAS is a software library for linear algebra that provides a mature, open-source implementation of the Basic Linear Algebra Subprograms (BLAS) Application Program Interface (API) for C and Fortran77.
HSI is a technique that combines conventional imaging and spectroscopy to identify and classify various objects within a 3D image. HSI is used in applications that include mapping, reconnaissance and surveillance, and environmental monitoring. Similar to other remote-sensing techniques, HSI typically deals with large amounts of data that in some applications must be processed in real-time to provide immediate assessment of potentially threatening scenarios. Figure 5 illustrates the dataflow diagram of the HSI implementation. Each participating node acquires a slab of the input image, calculates the autocorrelation sample matrix (ACSM), and transmits the results to a single root node. The root node processes the data collected from each node in the weight calculation stage and broadcasts C classification constraints to each node. The nodes then classify the original image data based on the constraints and save the resulting data to construct an output image.
The variables in Figure 5 are as follows: pixels per row/column (N), spectral bands (L), number of processors (P), and number of classification constraints (C). Table 4 displays the number of operations executed in each of the three main stages of calculation -1) ACSM, 2) Weight Calculation, and 3) Classification -and provides the actual operation count for a 256x256x1024 input image. † 
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B. Component-level Radiation Testing
Component-level radiation testing was conducted using both heavy-ion and proton beam sources to radiate the major components on the COTS data processor board to determine their susceptibilities. Table 3 provides a list of the main components that were exposed. Registers used by 7447a
The component-level testing had two main goals: 1) to determine whether or not the component catastrophically latched up and 2) to observe the SEE profile of the component. If the component catastrophically latched-up then it could not be used in a radiation environment. Data was also collected for each component that characterized its SEE behavior such that this information could be used as inputs to the DM predictive models.
Further details on the component-level radiation tests can be found in Ref. 2.
C. System Profiling
System profiling was a critical step in the approach taken to validate the DM technology. By profiling the system, we identified the key software components using the various hardware devices within the system. This was important not only for testing purposes (e.g. SWIFI testing) but it also dictated which software components required more fault tolerance due to their utilization of radiation susceptible devices (as indicated by component-level radiation testing). With TRL6 validation complete, this system profile data will continue to be used within the DM models to predict the SWIFI profile of a candidate application. This prediction can be made by comparing the system profiles from the candidate and baseline applications and translating the baseline application's SWIFI characterization according to the comparison. Without this profile data, SWIFI testing can become an arduous and expensive task.
For the validation of the DM system, the system was profiled executing the HSI application. The system-level profiling tool used was OProfile. OProfile is capable of profiling many parts of a running system such as the kernel, shared libraries, and user processes. The tool takes advantage of native processor performance counters in order to minimize perturbation that can skew the profiles collected. As a result it can collect counts for wide range of events (e.g. cache hits/misses, completed instructions, etc.
‡ ) for most of the software components running on the system. It also supports user-definable sampling intervals as another mechanism to control perturbation and intrusion on normal system operation. More details on OProfile can be found at http://oprofile.sourceforge.net/. ‡ The performance counter data collected by OProfile is ultimately dictated by the processor's support for counting specific events. Table 4 displays the main DM system resources OProfile monitored. In order to extract the necessary data required for each of the resources, one or more events must be considered as indicated in the "Notes" column. 
D. SWIFI Testing
While radiation testing exposes the system to an accelerated radiation environment, the sensitivities of specific hardware devices can dominate error types and, as a result, mask other error types that could occur if DMM is used on other platforms with different hardware. This could have lead to untested or "uncovered" areas of DMM code that would be susceptible to faults. In contrast, SWIFI testing provided the capability to comprehensively test DMM code by exposing it to numerous fault types in a controlled environment. Radiation testing is also completely random and the radiation cannot be isolated to specific circuit areas on the exposed device(s), whereas SWIFI faults are highly controllable and can target fine-grained features regardless of their physical size or SEE susceptibility. Due to its controllability, SWIFI was used to observe the system's response given a particular fault injected into a specific component. The primary objectives of SWIFI testing were: 1) to demonstrate that DMM provides a high degree of SEE tolerance, 2) to characterize the system by profiling the fault-to-error mappings for use in the DM predictive models, and 3) to observe and verify the DM system response to each error type including measurements of recovery times.
Although SWIFI is highly controllable, it is limited with regards to its ability to reach all circuits and devices since it can only reach software-accessible areas. As a result, SWIFI was unable to directly emulate all radiation induced fault types. However, even with this limitation, it still has numerous targets (e.g. processor registers, memory-mapped device registers, and main memory) it can inject. When combining the space dimension (i.e. number of targets) with the time dimension, a seemingly simple SWIFI test can require tens of millions of random injections in order to "cover" (i.e. SWIFI coverage) all areas of the target components. Considering the statistical relevance of the results from each injection can further inflate the number of injections into the billions. In order to reduce the number of injections, Honeywell developed a methodology that uses knowledge of the architecture and software behavior to allow fault injection campaigns to focus on target components and code segments that are highly susceptible to faults and/or highly utilized. The assumption is that the components that are more susceptible to faults AND are highly utilized will experience a significant number of errors. Likewise, the areas of code that are likely to be affected by these errors are those that are most likely to use the impacted component and/or are executed most frequently. Figure 6 illustrates the entire SWIFI process. The SEU-Susceptibility Analysis portion of the process (see leftmost part of Figure 6 ) identifies those hardware and software components that were fault susceptible and/or highly utilized. To accomplish this characterization, two databases of information were used: 1) system-level profiling data and 2) component-level radiation data. The information contained in these databases allowed Honeywell to create fault-injection campaigns to target the components that were most likely to cause potential problems due to injected faults. Once the campaigns were generated, they were passed to the Fault Injection Tool. The injection tool injected faults into the testbed in order to gather DM log data on the components affected by, the system's response to, and the recovery time for each fault.
SEU-Susceptibility Analysis
System-level profiling data provided identification of the software components that heavily used various physical components on the analyzed DP. This information allowed us to reduce our injections to only target the most active processes and the hardware components with the highest utilizations. When this information was combined with component-level radiation data, SWIFI campaigns were further reduced to focus injections into those components that displayed high fault rates. The result was a set of highly focused campaigns that captured how the system responded to the faults that were most likely to occur.
Campaign Tailoring
It was possible to further reduce the number of fault injection campaigns conducted using analytical analysis. Some components were composed of sub-components that had little or no effect on the system when hit by an SEU. These injections were "wasted" and therefore, did not need to be repeated or conducted in the first place. However, the system response for the identified sub-component(s) had to still be accounted for (e.g. no effect) when Honeywell combined and analyzed the system responses from the SWIFI tests. Similarly, targets were evaluated based on their expected system responses and those targets that were expected to have similar responses were consolidated into a single campaign that targets only one of the targets rather than all targets. The results for that single target were assumed to be applicable to the other targets thus improving SWIFI coverage while keeping injection counts to a minimum. An example of similar targets in the current DM system would be L1 Dcache and L2 cache. While the rates of each target were different, the system response of a parity error within each cache level was the same.
Campaign Generation
There were two types of campaigns used in the SWIFI process: 1) the fault injection campaign and 2) the SWIFI campaign. A fault injection campaign consists of one or more fault injections that typically target a single 
Fault Injection Process
The Fault Injection Process used the campaign files generated using the SEU-Susceptibility Analysis data and conducted fault injections into the DM Testbed using a Fault Injection Tool. The subsequent sections describe the various facets of this process including a description of the Fault Injection Tool and the testbed setup and configuration.
Fault Injection Tool
Armored Computing Inc.'s Network Fault Tolerance and Performance Evaluator (NFTAPE) was selected TRL6 fault injection campaigns due to its flexibility, portability, and our previous experience using it during TRL5. NFTAPE supported several injection options. These options were categorized as methods, targets, and modes. The two methods supported were: 1) breakpoint-based -in which faults were injected into targets only when a breakpoint instruction was executed, and 2) random -in which faults were injected into the target after a userspecified delay. The targeting options included fault injections into a specific process's instructions, most of the 7447a registers (general-purpose, floating-point, Altivec, and special-purpose registers), the bridge device registers, and memory (text, data, or stack). SWIFI only emulated cache parity errors due to the fact that parity bits were updated automatically by hardware and the 7447a did not provide a mechanism to dynamically disable/enable this hardware. Relative to mode, NFTAPE supported injections into kernel and user space. Kernel space injections were used for injections into kernel functions and injections into memory without process affinity. User space injections affected only the process specified by the user.
Testbed
A diagram of the SWIFI testbed configuration for TRL6 is shown in Figure 7 . The DM system consisted of a single system controller, three data processing (DP) nodes, and an emulated mass data store (via a DP node). Two of the three DPs were used to collect system-level profile data while the remaining node served as the target for injected faults. Two supplementary machines provided various test support functions such as collecting telemetry data from the DM system (VPSIM machine), executing the fault injection campaigns (headnode3), and hosting a network file system used by the DPs (headnode3).
Using Campaign Results
After campaigns were run and the data post-processed, we translated the results into a form that was used within the DM modeling framework. The results gathered from SWIFI testing represented error reports from highly controlled fault injections. Since SWIFI supported injections into highly targeted areas, the impacts (i.e. error syndromes § ) observed were scaled based on their likelihood to occur in a realistic radiation environment. The scaling factor used was based on the size of the feature targeted when injecting into hardware (area-based weighting) and the utilization of a particular code segment when instructions were targeted (utilization-based weighting). The following subsections present the concepts behind area-based and utilization-based weighting.
Injection Coverage
Since SWIFI had the capability to inject highly targeted faults without regards the actual size of the target (unlike the natural process of radiation where feature size and technology implementation normally dictated the number of faults experienced by a sub-system) and the actual frequency of execution (applicable to breakpointbased injections), the results of each campaign were scaled such that we account for the likelihood of the injected faults actually occurring in the system. In order to scale each campaign's results, we considered the target's relative size and relative execution time (i.e. the injection coverage of the campaign). The injection coverage was calculated based on the equations below with Table 5 presenting the variables used. The equation employed for a campaign depended on whether the target was randomly injected in time or was injected into via breakpoints (and thus dependent on some software to execute). The equations above make the assumptions that the area of a particular target or set of targets can be approximated by the number of bits within the target(s). The values of BitCount k and BitCount TotalC variables are system dependent while the values for T k and T Frame are primarily application dependent. Figure 8 illustrates a simple example of how our methodology distributed sub-component fault rates across a device (different colors represent domains that have a measured fault rate). It also shows how we split these sub-components into SWIFI targets (delimited by dotted lines) with each target having an associated InjCoverage (abbreviated as IC in Figure 8 ) that effectively weighted the fault-to-error ratio determined through SWIFI tests to reflect the actual impact of the target on the overall fault-to-error ratio of the entire sub-system. § See "Error Syndrome" subsection in Section E1 for a list of all error syndromes. 
The PES i,k value was calculated by dividing the number of injections in campaign k that caused error syndrome i (NES i ) by the total number of injection for campaign k (N Total ). See equation below. 
The ICov k,l value is the number of overlapping bits between campaign k and campaign l. These areas of overlap were treated as new campaigns with error syndrome probabilities assigned values according the averages of the overlapping probabilities. For more details on this concept including an example that walks through each step of the process explained in this section, refer to Ref. 2.
E. Modeling
The modeling stage was the linchpin of our TRL6 validation approach. This stage uses radiation, SWIFI, and system profile data to formulate predictions for the performance, availability, and computational consistency of a DM system in a given radiation environment. The DM model framework illustration in Figure 9 shows the five models identified by circled numbers. The figure also shows the high-level DM model dataflow along with the dependencies between each model. These models are described in the following subsections along with their inputs, outputs, and the various techniques and functionality.
SEU Susceptibility Model (Model 1)
The SEU Susceptibility Model, identified in the boxed area labeled by the circled number 1 in Figure 9 , characterized the system's ability to detect and handle errors that manifested from SEUs. This characterization was handled using SWIFI testing as described in the previous section.
Error syndromes
Error syndromes were the resulting symptoms within the system that occur due to an error. The DM system identified fourteen primary error syndromes listed in Table 7 . System experiences issue that requires all data processors to be rebooted System Crash System experiences issue that requires power cycles to entire system Network Failure System network device/configuration breaks
Recovery times
For each error syndrome, there was an associated recovery time. The recovery time depended on the type of error that occurred as well as the component(s) affected. Recovery times were used by the DM Predictive Models in order to calculate system availability. Shorter recovery times translated into higher system availability and vice versa. 
Radiation Effects Model (Model 2)
The Radiation Effects Model, identified in the boxed area labeled by the circled number 2 in Figure 9 , consisted of two radiation environment modeling software packages, SpaceRad 5.0 and CREME96 (Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro-Electronics (1996 Revision)). Both packages were used to predict the radiation performance, i.e. the SEE cross sections, of DM components in a number of orbital environments based on the SEE cross sections observed during terrestrial component-level radiation testing.
SpaceRad
The Space Radiation (SpaceRad) software package is a widely-used engineering tool that models ionizing radiation exposure in space systems caused by the Van Allen belts, solar flares, and galactic cosmic radiation. The SpaceRad tool is a comprehensive package that simplifies orbit integration, radiation transport, and radiation effects calculations. It allowed us to predict total dose, single-event upsets, solar cell damage, latchup, and displacement damage in spacecraft electronics by modeling the ionizing radiation environments in space and in the atmosphere including the effects of trapped protons and electrons, solar protons, galactic cosmic radiation, and neutrons. The tool allowed the environments to be integrated along any orbit or trajectory. The standard edition of the SpaceRad software package contains the following models:
1. AP-8 trapped proton models 2. AE-8 trapped electron models 3. CREME cosmic radiation models 4. JPL 1991 solar proton model 5. IGRF/DGRF magnetic field models 6. Total dose from electrons, protons, and heavy ions 7. Dose equivalent for human exposure
More information about the Space Radiation software package can be found in http://www.spacerad.com.
CREME96
CREME96 is a suite of programs used to create numerical models of the ionizing radiation environment in nearEarth orbits, evaluate the resulting radiation effects on electronic systems in spacecraft and high-altitude aircraft, and estimate the high-LET radiation environment within manned spacecraft. CREME was first developed in 1981 by a team led by Dr. Jim Adams of the Cosmic Ray Physics Section at Naval Research Laboratory. Since then, CREME has become a widely-used design tool in the aerospace industry. Many other radiation environment software packages, including Space Rad, which address the same issues as CREME, have incorporated routines from the original CREME program suite. All of the models and capabilities of CREME96 are superior to the corresponding elements of previous versions of the CREME code. Comparisons to on-orbit data have demonstrated the accuracy of the model improvements. (See the CREME96 Reference https://creme96.nrl.navy.mil for details.) CREME96 has been extensively beta-tested by users, and no errors in the CREME96 models were reported have been modeled.
Combining SpaceRad and CREME96
There were advantages to using both the SpaceRad and CREME96 tools. Both software packages used the DM component-level radiation test results as input and, for all intents and purposes, both software packages convolved the Weibull curves, cross-section as a function of energy, with the energy spectrum of the environment of interest to estimate the SEE rates for that environment. To estimate the proton-induced SEE rates for the DM analysis, we used the CREME96 tool. Honeywell used the SpaceRad 5.0 software for all previous rate calculations for the DM project, so a comparison of the results for the Broadcom receiver was performed to determine the relationship of the tool results. The inputs to the tools were: a description of the orbit, a shield model, a specification of a space weather model (AP-8 was used for these calculations), and the Weibull parameters including: L o = Onset Energy (MeV), σ SAT = saturated cross-section (cm 2 ), W = width (MeV), and S = power (unitless). For the example comparison of a 1300km × 320 km × 98º orbit and the assumption of a 0.100" spherical aluminum shield, the predicted CREME96 rate was 16% higher than the predicted SpaceRad 5.0 rate. One benefit of using the CREME96 software was the ability to calculate upset rates for 10 devices per run. The radiation effects community generally agrees that the CREME96 trapped proton model is more accurate than the Space Radiation tool's proton model, but Space Rad tool can handle both protons and electrons.
Application Model (Model 3)
The Application Model, identified in the boxed area labeled by the circled number 3 in Figure 9 , provided characterization data on a candidate application executing on the DM system. The model used system-level characterization data since different applications have the potential to exercise the system differently. A system-level profiling tool was used to gather this information. The goal of the application model was to provide a convenient way to calculate mapping factors that could be used to scale SWIFI data collected using a baseline application to represent the SWIFI data that would have resulted from SWIFI testing a candidate application. Profile data allowed us to approximate how resources within the system were being used, thus circumventing lengthy and costly SWIFI testing for preliminary system evaluation.
Profile Data
System-level profile data was composed of simple count values for the number of times a specific resource was used in a particular way. These count values provided a means to approximate the utilization of a particular resource by each process running on the system. Cache was a special case where event counts did not easily translate to utilization due to locality. In order to account for locality, we classified the profiled processes as control or data processes. We assumed that control processes have relatively low locality therefore the count values corresponded one-to-one with its cache utilization. Data processes, on the other hand, tend to have higher locality and thus Honeywell's approach scaled the count value by some constant, L, to calculate its cache utilization. The equation below illustrates the translation between process i's count value, N i , and its utilization, U i .
The value of L depends on the classification of process i. For all processes classified as a control process, L was assumed to equal 1. For those processes classified as data processes, the L value was assumed to be 4.
One critical piece of information that was missing from the processor's performance counters was network activity. Custom state-of-health messages provided network transmission information that could be used to profile the amount of data transferred to/from a node. This additional information allowed us to calculate the average utilization of the network by a particular node.
Application Mapping Factor Calculations
The goal of the application model was to use existing SWIFI data from a baseline application and translate it to represent the response of a candidate application without having to SWIFI-characterize the candidate application. In order to accomplish this translation, the utilization information from both applications could be used to scale the baseline application's characterization data. The basic assumption when conducting this translation is that the error syndrome response of the candidate application will increase when compared to the baseline if the utilization, U, of each impacted resource goes up and vice versa. Application Mapping Factors (AMFs) use the utilization values gathered from the baseline and candidate applications in order to scale the component fault rates gathered during component-level radiation tests. The equation used to calculate the AMFs for a candidate application given a component fault, j, is shown below.
Some component faults are application independent, and therefore, their AMF values are set to 1. Table 8 illustrates the AMF used for each component fault measured for the current DM system. 
Fault/Error Model (Model 4)
The Fault/Error Model, identified in the boxed area labeled by the circled number 4 in Figure 9 combined the data from the SEU-Susceptibility Model, the Radiation Effects Model, and the Application Model in order to generate error syndrome rates that were used by the DM Predictive Models. The model used the fault-to-error syndrome mapping data from the SEU-Susceptibility Model to convert the fault rates from the Radiation Effects Model to error syndrome rates. Although no application mapping was conducted during this study, the Application Model's mapping factor could be applied to the fault-to-error syndrome data to adjust it based on the candidate application's resource profile. The next section provides more details on the conversion and scaling process.
Calculating Error Syndrome Rates
Error Syndrome Rates (ESRs) were calculated by combining the results from the previous stages through a merging equation WESP ij , as defined previously, is the Weighted Error Syndrome Probability of error syndrome i for the jth component of M total component fault types. The final ESRs were employed by the predictive models described in the next section.
DM Predictive Model (Model 5)
The DM Predictive Model, identified in the boxed area labeled by the circled number 5 in Figure 9 , was composed of two sub-models, the discrete-event simulation model and the uncertainty model. The discrete-event simulation model used the error syndrome rates from the Fault/Error Model, the timing information from the SEU Susceptibility model, and the application information from the Application Model to calculate the system availability, computational consistency, and performance. The uncertainty model calculated the system's availability and computational consistency using component-level radiation rates, SWIFI results, and application data while considering uncertainties in the input data. Both models supported Monte Carlo simulations to determine confidence levels on the reported results; however, only the uncertainty model results were calculated during this study.
Refer to Ref. 2 for low-level details on the discrete-event simulation model and uncertainty model.
DM Model Database
The DM Model Database is an Excel Workbook comprised of thirteen (13) worksheets. Each worksheet represents a model or function within the DM modeling framework that helps map component-level fault rates and SWIFI system responses to error syndrome rates. Table 9 presents a list of the worksheets along with a brief description of each. Presented error syndrome rates calculated in the Candidate Mapping worksheet in a convenient format to be used in the DM Predictive Model. It also contained addition input (E.g. recovery times) to the predictive model if necessary.
F. System-level Radiation Testing
The DM system was subjected to a unique testing scenario in which the entire system executed the HSI application while a single DP board was exposed to a proton radiation beam of varying energies. The purpose of this test was to observe and validate the system responses when a data processor experiences various fault types. The data collected from the DM system during exposure was used to compare to the results predicted by the models described in the previous section.
The test setup for system-level radiation testing of DM TRL6 testbed is shown in Figure 10 . Two assumptions were made in order to use the data collected during this test to represent the behavior of the entire system in a radiation environment: 1) the system controller is upset immune and 2) each DP has an identical radiation profile. Over three days of testing, 59 exposure experiments at various beam energies were conducted. These experiments encompassed enough beam time to reach proton fluences equivalent to >2 years of operation time in a 1300km × 320km × 98° orbit.
Refer to Ref. 2 for more details on the system-level radiation tests conducted.
G. Programmability and Ease of Use
In order to demonstrate the programmability and ease of use of the DM system, a third party application developer with no prior knowledge of DM was asked to port over his applications. Dr. Ken Mighell from the National Optical Astronomy Observatory (NOAO) was selected to conduct the port of two astrophysics applications, CRBLASTER and QLWPC2. The goal of this exercise was to obtain an independent, qualitative assessment of the porting process along with quantitative details with regards to porting time and system overhead. The results from Dr. Mighell showed the system is in fact very programmable and easy to use with porting times on the order of a couple hours for each application with each application having thousands of lines of source code. Specific details on Dr. Mighell's porting process can be found in Ref. 1 
IV. DM Technology Results
The validation approach presented in this paper and the information exhibited in Ref. 1 describe the tools and methods we used to achieve TRL6 for DM Technology. The results in the following sections focus on the DM models' capability to predict the performance, availability, and computational consistency of a system utilizing DM technology in an arbitrary radiation environment. The first section presents a comparison between the models' predictions versus the actual data collected during system-level radiation testing. Once validated, we applied the models to predict the performance, availability, and computational consistency of the TRL6 testbed system executing the HSI application in two orbits: 1) the "relevant environment" and 2) a LEO orbit. These orbital predictions are introduced in the second section. Table 10 compares the number of error syndrome occurrences observed during system-level radiation testing to the number of each error syndrome predicted by the DM model in order to validate the accuracy of the model. The number of error syndrome occurrences predicted by the model compared favorably with the number of error syndrome occurrences observed during system-level testing with the exception of the JMA crashes, HAM hangs, and node hangs. There are several reasons for the large discrepancies between the observed and predicted values for these three error syndromes. First, the DM software was enhanced to remedy some anomalous behaviors seen during system-level radiation testing. The enhanced version of the DM software was used during SWIFI testing and thus could have contributed to the reduced error syndrome counts predicted by the model. Discrepancies could have also arisen due to the limitations of the SWIFI tools to cause faults in inaccessible devices and circuits whereas the radiation beam could affect any component on the exposed DP. Finally, variations in the test setups between the component-level radiation tests, which provided the input rates used by the models, and the system-level radiation tests could have also contributed to the differences.
A. Model Validation
B. Orbital Predictions
The validated model provided predictions for the performance, availability, and computational consistency for the TRL6 DM system based in the "relevant environment" and a 955 km × 460 km × 98° LEO orbit. The relevant environment is a hypothetical worst-case environment comprising the worst-case proton (1470 km circular orbit at 53 o inclination) and worst-case heavy ion (GEO) radiation environments for candidate NASA missions. Table 11 illustrates the predictions ** made by the models given a variable number of nodes as well as variable amount of ABFT coverage (i.e. data protection). ** Predicted values reported for availability and computational consistency have a 95% confidence level. From Table 11 , one can see that for both radiation environments, as the number of nodes in the system increases, the availability decreases while the computational consistency increases. These trends are due to the fact that the probability of a fault affecting the HSI application's execution is directly proportional to system size. That is, the larger the system, the more likely it is that a fault will interrupt the execution of the HSI application and thus decrease the system's availability and increase its computational consistency.
Another trend shown in Table 11 is that the performance (in terms of throughput density) of the system decreases with the number of nodes. The availability of the system impacts the overall performance of the system; however, in this case, the primary cause for the drop in performance with increasing system size is from the parallel inefficiencies of the HSI implementation.
V. Conclusions
The DM project held successful TRL6 technology validation reviews in 2008 and 2009. The DM TRL6 technology validation approach included component-level radiation beam tests to determine component SEU, SEL, and SEFI rates of the COTS DP boards, comprehensive software-based fault injection testing to profile the fault/error syndrome mapping and validated the DM system responses to faults, and system-level radiation beam testing in which one (1) COTS DP board was exposed to a proton beam while executing the HSI application to validate the DM design and operation in a radiation environment. The system-level radiation beam experiment was also used to validate the predictive DM models so that they can be used to predict DM performance, availability, and computational consistency for different missions and in different radiation environments. The DM model developed for the DM TRL6 technology validation has much broader significance in that, while it satisfied the needs for the DM project, it represents a generic process that can be used to evaluate technologies for use in space.
The DM models were shown to be capable of predicting the fault rates, error rates, and performance metrics for a number of orbits and orbit regimes including the relevant environment and the 955 km × 460 km × 98° LEO orbit. The models predicted that a 3-node DM system could achieve >0.992 availability in the relevant environment and >0.999 availability for the LEO orbit. The models also showed that a 3-node DM system could achieve a computational consistency of <5.7 and <0.5 data errors in a five year period for the relevant environment and LEO orbit, respectively.
Over the past few generations, COTS computer components have become more resistant to total dose and SEL effects of radiation. The primary issue preventing the deployment of a COTS-based, space-borne cluster computer is their continued susceptibility to SEEs that typically only cause soft, transient errors, not permanent hardware failures. DM technology provides a robust solution to mitigate the effects of SEEs on COTS devices in order to provide mission-enabling performance and performance density as well as significant time and cost savings in porting laboratory scientific application codes to the flight system. As a result, Honeywell is dedicated to champion DM technology for future NASA science and DoD missions such as lander and rover applications, unmanned vehicles, Stratellites, and Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) applications where DM's high computational throughput density combined with reduced development schedule can help ensure program success.
